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Can TYPO3 afford its new governance?

At some point, an organization can become so busy organizing itself that the organization starts to look like the main project. I spent part of this weekend trying to work out whether TYPO3 is getting uncomfortably close to that point.

Estimated reading time: 7 min

Counting the machinery

What the new structure actually adds

TYPO3 is currently reviewing a fairly substantial new governance structure with six Units and a Unit Cooperation Panel. The goals sound reasonable enough. Responsibilities should become clearer, coordination should improve, decisions should be better documented and administrative work should be reduced, especially for volunteers.

That last part caught my attention, because the proposed solution contains quite a lot of administration. So I started counting.

Each Unit needs at least five Members, including a Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator, and its Council should meet at least once a month. Six Units therefore give us at least 30 positions and 72 regular Council meetings per year. By default, the Units also produce quarterly activity and budget reports, adding another 24 reports.

Then there is the Unit Cooperation Panel. Seven members, quarterly meetings, quarterly reports and responsibility for the overall roadmap, cross-Unit coordination and conflicts between Units.

We are now at 76 regular meetings and 28 regular reports per year, before a single Initiative or Working Group enters the picture. Somebody also has to prepare those meetings, document decisions, maintain roles and responsibilities, organize elections and keep the whole thing moving between meetings.

Meetings need people

Even the minimum adds up

But meetings have this annoying habit of requiring people.

Assume every Unit Council meeting lasts exactly one hour and only the minimum quorum of three people attends. That alone is 216 person-hours per year. Add the Cooperation Panel at minimum quorum and we reach 236 hours.

That still excludes preparation, follow-up, reports, elections and any other kind of additional coordination. Just people sitting in the recurring meetings suggested by the rules.

Obviously, 236 hours will not kill TYPO3. It is simply an interesting lower edge for a structure intended to reduce administrative work for volunteers, and this is where the history of the proposal becomes relevant.

Borrowed concept

Built for a very different organization

In the earlier governance proposal that preceded the current review, the authors explicitly explained that they had not invented the underlying approach from scratch. The preface said the rules were “largely derived from regulations that the German Red Cross has developed and tested over more than 150 years.”

I can understand the appeal. Why invent governance from scratch when another nonprofit organization has spent more than a century learning how to organize volunteers?

There is just one fairly important detail: TYPO3 is not the German Red Cross. The similarity is that both involve nonprofit structures and volunteers. After that, things become rather different.

Scale changes everything

Volunteer governance without a professional backbone

The DRK operates emergency services, disaster response, welfare services, hospitals, care facilities and a huge organizational infrastructure. It has more than 470,000 volunteers, more than 217,000 paid employees and around 2.5 million supporting members.

The TYPO3 Association, in comparison, has roughly 1,100 members. In total.

The 217,000 paid employees are the part I find particularly interesting. They give the DRK an enormous professional organization behind its volunteer structures. Councils, reporting lines, administration, coordination and formal responsibilities can be supported by people whose actual job is to make the organization work.

TYPO3 does not have anything remotely comparable to that workforce.

The pattern doesn’t transfer

Proven elsewhere is not proven here

Yes, TYPO3 companies give employees paid contribution time. That is valuable and the project depends on it. But an agency paying a developer to spend some working hours on TYPO3 does not create the equivalent of a professional administrative organization. In most cases that developer still has exactly the same limited hours available for code, documentation, reviews, support and governance.

This matters when we talk about established organizational patterns.

A pattern can be perfectly proven and still be wrong for another system. Its assumptions have to survive the transfer. Otherwise we are doing the organizational equivalent of discovering a very successful enterprise architecture and deploying it on a Raspberry Pi because both are computers.

The DRK comparison therefore does not reassure me. It makes the capacity question even more important, quite apart from another problem we have discussed before: Parts of the DRK framework come from an environment where formal instructions, chains of command and even obedience are legitimate organizational concepts.

Who pays for the process?

When governance and contribution draw from the same pool

So what exactly are we transferring from an organization with hundreds of thousands of paid employees into an Open Source project that depends heavily on volunteer time? Which parts still make sense when the administrative workforce disappears? Which parts become overhead that the contributors themselves have to absorb?

That overhead is the governance tax. Every organization pays one, and some of it is necessary. Decisions need owners, money needs accountability and conflicts occasionally need someone to resolve them. TYPO3 certainly has governance problems worth fixing.

The problem is that administrative capacity and productive capacity often come from the same people. Someone spending an evening on a quarterly report may also be the person reviewing a Core patch. Someone documenting governance decisions might otherwise maintain an extension, improve accessibility or help another contributor.

The proposal itself appears to recognize this. Its FAQ says that some form of compensation for Unit Coordinators will be necessary, and compensation for the Panel Chair is considered likely as well.

Which raises a fairly obvious question. How much, and at what rates?

When the structure starts feeding itself

Scarce capacity concentrates responsibility

There is another consequence when the available capacity is smaller than the structure requires. The proposed rules explicitly allow people to hold roles in several Units. That may well become necessary if there are not enough people to fill them all, and then the system starts feeding itself.

The reliable people collect several roles. Responsibility, knowledge and authority accumulate around them. Their workload increases. Somebody eventually steps back. The remaining pool gets smaller, so the remaining people collect even more responsibility.

Keep that going for long enough and you have what I would politely call a bureaucratic death spiral. No evil mastermind is required. Everybody involved can have excellent intentions. A structure that requires more organizational capacity than the community can provide will still concentrate responsibility because somebody has to keep it running.

That is why I think this proposal needs a capacity calculation.

Show me the math

Capacity before structure

How much administrative work do we have today? Which parts disappear? How much does the new structure add? How many people and hours do we realistically expect to need, and which of those hours will actually be funded?

Maybe the calculation shows that everything is fine. Maybe parts of the structure need to become lighter or some roles need proper funding. Both would be useful results. What I have not seen so far is the calculation that turns “less administrative work for volunteers” from a goal into a plausible outcome.

The proposals are still under public review until 6 September 2026. Most people affected by them will probably never read two long GitHub pull requests and the discussion underneath, which is precisely why I think this deserves a wider conversation. Have a look at those proposals and make up your own mind while the review is still open.

TYPO3 wants clearer responsibilities and less administrative work for volunteers. But the proposed structure adds meetings, reports, roles, coordination and potentially paid positions, all drawing from the same limited pool that also builds and maintains the project. What is missing is the capacity calculation showing whether that promise can realistically hold.  My question remains fairly simple. Who is going to do all this governance work, why should we believe it will reduce bureaucracy, and what price are we going to pay for it?

Jo Hasenau